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English
The growing recognition that social problems are multi-faceted and need to be tackled in a way that
cuts across traditional departmental boundaries has heralded the advent of joined-up government.
Yet this new emphasis does not appear to have permeated the provision of public services in
Northern Ireland in their response to the increasingly pervasive social problem of communal violence
perpetrated by paramilitaries against those suspected of committing crime within their own
communities. This article examines the response of governmental and non-governmental agencies
to this issue and questions whether victims of violence could benefit from an integrated approach.
A deep suspicion and mistrust of the statutory authorities and the ‘undeserving’ character of victims
currently militate against a joined-up approach.
Français
La prise de conscience croissante que les problèmes sociaux ont de multiples facettes et doivent
être appréhendés sans tenir compte des limites départementales traditionnelles, a vu l’avènement
d’un gouvernement intégré.  Cependant, cette récente recommandation ne semble pas avoir avoir
eu une incidence sur la prestation des services publics en Irlande du Nord dans sa réaction au
problème social de plus en plus présent de la violence communautaire perpétrée par des paramilitaires
contre ceux qui sont soupçonnés d’avoir commis des délits dans leurs propres communautés. Cet
article examine la réponse à ce problème  des agences gouvernementales et non gouvernementales
et demande si les victimes de la violence pourraient profiter d’une approche intégrée.  Une profonde
méfiance à l’égard des pouvoirs publics ainsi que le caractère « indigne de soutien » des victimes
compromettent actuellement  une approche intégrée.
Español
El creciente reconocimiento que los problemas sociales están experimentando  y necesitan abordarse
de manera que corte a través de los linderos de departamentos tradicionales, ha anunciado el
advenimiento de un gobierno unido. Sin embargo esta nueva énfasis no parece haber penetrado la
provisión de los servicios públicos en Irlanda del norte en su respuesta al creciente problema social
reinante de violencia comunal perpetrada por los paramilitares contra aquellos de quienes se sospecha
que cometan crímenes en sus propias comunidades. Este artículo examina la respuesta de agencias
gubernamentales y no gubernamentales en este asunto y se pregunta si las víctimas de violencia
podrían beneficiarse de un acercamiento integrado. Una profunda desconfianza y sospecha de las
autoridades estatutarias y el carácter de  “no ser digno” de las víctimas actualmente militan contra
un acercamiento unido.
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Introduction
Despite the euphoria surrounding the Belfast
Agreement, the political rhetoric that ‘the guns
are silent’ and the fragile status of devolution in
Northern Ireland, an insidious form of commu-
nal violence persists. Paramilitaries are actively
engaged in administering ‘justice’ through ‘pun-
ishment’ beatings and shootings aimed at those
accused of committing criminal activities with-
in their communities. This is described as the
informal criminal justice system and remains
impervious to political, security and constitu-
tional gains aimed at securing greater stability
in Northern Ireland. This article considers ways
in which both governmental and non-govern-
mental agencies have responded to this ongoing
violence and assesses whether victims of
paramilitary violence could benefit from an in-
tegrated response. The article draws on evidence
from other policy areas and empirical work
carried out with statutory and voluntary organi-
sations closely involved with the problem in
Northern Ireland. It questions the corporate ca-
pacity for a joined-up response to tackling this
problem in two ways: first, the specific features
of devolution in Northern Ireland have militat-
ed against an integrated response; and second,
by the absence of trust between the stakehold-
ers upon which a joined-up approach is
predicated.
‘Joined-up’ government
It has now become fashionable to promote an
integrated response to complex social issues in
public services such as health, education and
employment. The idea gathered momentum
through Tony Blair’s national crusade against
social exclusion in which inter-departmental ac-
tion teams have been set up to coordinate
policies which are shared by departments or fall
between their boundaries – ‘joined-up problems
need joined-up solutions’ (Blair, 1998). This has
also been operationalised through area-based
partnerships to tackle inequalities in areas of
highest social need. Hence, Health Action Zones
have been set up to develop health improvement
programmes through a partnership comprising
health authorities, local government, NHS trusts
and new primary care groups. Education Action
Zones have been established to tackle low lev-
els of educational attainment, adopting similar
collaborative arrangements (businesses, commu-
nity organisations and parent representatives),
and Employment Zones (‘New Deal for Com-
munities’) set up in areas suffering from a high
concentration of long-term unemployment.
Joining up, according to Bevir and Rhodes
(2001), takes various forms such as area-based
programmes linking central and local govern-
ment, health authorities, the private sector and
voluntary organisations, and group-focused pro-
grammes targeting polic ies aimed at client
groups. The state under New Labour “is an ena-
bling partner that joins and steers flexible
networks ... the task is to build bridges between
the organisations involved in designing policies
and delivering services” (Bevir and Rhodes,
2001: 127). The philosophy behind such an ap-
proach is that resources are being wasted due to
insufficient collaboration between agencies and
a new emphasis is needed to “promote more ho-
listic and preventative approaches to social
policy problems” (Painter, 1999: 109). This ap-
proach is rooted in the government’s agenda of
‘renewal and reform’ heralded in Modernising
government, which promotes inclusiveness and
integration in policy making and programmes
(Cabinet Office, 1999a: 10).
Although the concept of ‘joined-up’ govern-
ment has become synonymous with the Blair
administration, its origins build on reforms over
the past fifty years which have attempted to
“combat the pathology of departmental govern-
ment” (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 3). Hence,
the Fulton Report on the civil service in 1968,
the White Paper The reorganisation of central
government in 1970, the establishment of the
Central Policy Review Staff and the Policy Unit
in Number 10 were all examples of attempts by
Wilson, Heath and Callaghan to take a more stra-
tegic view of government policy in the face of
strong Whitehall departmentalism. This contin-
ued with the election of the Thatcher government
in 1979 and its management reform programme
in the civil service (Rayner scrutinies, Financial
Management Initiative, Next Steps Agencies),
one aim of which was to tackle the silo-mental-
ity that existed in central government. John
Major approached the problem of departmen-
talism through White Papers such as Continuity
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and change (Prime Minister, 1994), aimed at per-
sonnel reforms to break down tradit ional
hierarchical structures. The perceived shortcom-
ings of these earlier reforms, according to
Kavanagh and Richards (2001), led to Blair’s
interest in the modernisation of government and
policy making which built on their foundations.
In order to modernise government it is seen as
necessary to ensure that policies are forward-
looking, inclusive, fair and delivered in a
joined-up way, regardless of organisational
structures.1 The Labour government acknowl-
edges that issues such as crime and social
exclusion cannot be tackled on a departmental
basis and is experimenting with different ways
of organising work around cross-cutting issues.
In a Cabinet Office report “the successful cross-
cutting review of the criminal justice system in
the comprehensive spending review” is cited as
an exemplar out of which emerged “a common
set of overarching aims and objectives for the
various criminal justice departments and
agencies” (Cabinet Office, 2000: 59).
The current crime reduction programme is
also an example which relies on coordinated
working across central and local government,
drawing on their expertise in policy develop-
ment, implementation and research to identify
and deliver measures for reducing crime. Under
this programme the government has launched
an integrated approach to tackling violence
against women (Living without fear, Cabinet
Office, 1999b). It recognises that volunteers,
community organisations , probation officers,
police, social workers and others have been
working to help and support women who expe-
rience violence. But government argues, “Help
is still not comprehensive enough or easily ac-
cessible. In some cases women are sent to up to
ten different places before they get the help they
need. And often how they are treated is entirely
a matter of where they live” (Cabinet Office,
1999b: 6). The government’s goal therefore is
to see effective partnerships operating through-
out England and Wales to tackle this problem
within five years.
A similar programme aimed at ensuring Bet-
ter Government for Older People is ongoing in
which integrated interagency strategies set out
innovative  ways of delivering services in a
coordinated and user-friendly way. Evaluators
of this programme highlighted how relationships
between the different tiers of state government
are changing partly in response to the
government’s drive to modernise and join up
governance and public services. “Multi-level and
citizen-centred governance implies not only
closer integration within and between the dif-
ferent tiers of the state, but also engagement with
the informal community governance structures
and processes within civil society” (Hayden and
Benington, 2000: 27). This is a particularly im-
portant conclusion when considering how and
why the informal criminal justice system oper-
ates within communities in Northern Ireland.
Hayden and Benington (2000: 28) conclude that
“new patterns of joined-up citizen-centred mul-
ti-level governance cannot be contained within
traditional metaphors of organisational pyra-
mids, but have to be pictured in terms of
inter-organisational networks, complex three-
dimensional webs, and cross-cutting lattices”.
Allied to this idea of collaborative working
are attempts to incorporate the output of the vol-
untary sector into public  programmes. The
government has acknowledged the contribution
made by the sector to social, economic, envi-
ronmental and cultural life and sought  to
establish partnership arrangements through a
‘compact’ which sets out their complementary
roles in the development and delivery of public
policy (Voluntary Activity Unit, 1998; Morison,
2000). This is very much in line with the La-
bour government’s efforts to find a ‘third way’
between state intervention and laissez-faire
which emphasises partnerships between govern-
ment and civil  associations (Blair,  1998;
Giddens, 1998; Tonkiss and Passey, 1999).
Joined-up government has, however, an intu-
itive political appeal. Who could disagree with
a holistic approach to service delivery? Moreo-
ver, it could imply that joined-up government is
an operational reality rather than, as critics would
argue, part of the untested political agenda of
New Labour. One critique suggests that “it is
legitimate to speculate that joined-up govern-
ment is a code for increasing the power of
Number 10 over ministers” (Kavanagh and Ri-
chards, 2001: 13). In other words it has more to
do with tackling competing power centres based
on strong departments within government and
reasserting the political will over a civil service
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concerned with protecting their vested depart-
mental interests. Kavanagh and Richards (2001:
17) conclude that “joined-up government relies
on prime ministerial authority rather than a well-
established institutional base and new cultural
values”.
What is perhaps surprising about this new
emphasis on joined-up government is that so lit-
tle of it appears to have permeated the thinking
of public services in Northern Ireland. In a wide-
ranging review of the structure, management and
resourcing of the criminal justice system ema-
nating from the 1998 Belfast Agreement, there
is no more than a passing reference to working
“cooperatively to reduce crime” (Criminal Jus-
tice Review Group, 2000: 35). Yet the problems
of violent crime, particularly the ongoing role
of paramilitaries in ceasefire circumstances, ex-
ercise several statutory and voluntary agencies.
The informal criminal justice system operates
whereby paramilitaries, largely immune from the
law, exert often violent control over people liv-
ing in their local areas. Such is the level of this
activity that it has been described as “a flour-
ishing culture of gangsterism” and a “Mafia
state” in which paramilitaries “perpetrate muti-
lations, beatings, shootings, intimidation and
exiling under the guise of maintaining law and
order within their communities” (Salter, 1999:
383).
Joined-up responses in criminal
justice
A joined-up approach in the field of criminal
justice preceded the current focus on holistic
government stimulated, in part, by Home Of-
fice circulars Partnership in crime prevention
(1990), Partnership in dealing with offenders in
the community: A decision document (1992) and
Interagency coordination to tackle domestic vi-
olence (1995). Researchers in the area have
observed that the integrated approach “has in-
creasingly come to be seen as a panacea for
recurring crises within criminal justice” (Craw-
ford and Jones, 1995: 17). Its application,
however, has not been without problems. In ex-
amining the relevance of an integrated approach
to domestic violence, for example, Hague and
Malos (1998) and Hague (1998) evaluated col-
laborative forums comprising local authorities
(housing and social services departments), the
police, probation,  local refuges and support
services, along with other voluntary sector or-
ganisations. They concluded that such an
approach can move beyond basic single agency
service provision and result in coordination, pre-
ventative and educative work. They qualified
their remarks, however, by adding that “we need
to be aware of the way in which a supposed com-
mitment to interagency co-ordination can allow
governments and authorities to ‘save face’ by
appearing to take on the issue of domestic vio-
lence while actually doing almost nothing”
(Hague and Malos, 1998: 385).
On a similar theme, Mama’s study (1989) of
domestic violence against black women in
Greater London, based on first-hand accounts
of their experiences in dealing with statutory and
voluntary agencies, painted a picture of individ-
uals caught in a complex and often alienating
web of state bureaucracies. While Mama high-
lighted the importance of integrated responses
to the problem, she cautioned against such an
approach multiplying the pain and suffering that
abused women and their children experience.
She found evidence that for black women this is
what often happens. “The case material indicates
that public services can quite easily become
coercive rather than supportive, particularly with
the linking up between the police state (police
forces, immigration service) and the welfare
state (housing,  social services, healthcare)”
(Mama, 1989: 135).
Phillips and Sampson (1998) reported re-
search on an integrated approach to reduce repeat
racial victimisation of Bengali and Somali resi-
dents on a local authority housing estate in east
London. What emerged was a ‘negative interac-
tion’ between victims and the statutory agencies
in the study – in particular the housing depart-
ment and the police. Victims were reluctant to
report incidents to the authorities because their
prior experience suggested that little if anything
was done; the statutory bodies claimed they
could do nothing until incidents were reported.
The researchers concluded that “the project
would have been more successful if it had been
accepted that agencies with a history of diffi-
cult working relationships are unlikely to work
productively in an interagency setting” (Phillips
and Sampson, 1998: 141).
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Crawford and Jones (1995) critique the work
of Pearson et al (1992) who suggest two domi-
nant perspectives in assessing integrated or
joined-up approaches to crime – a ‘benevolent’
and ‘conspiracy’ approach. In the former Pear-
son et al suggest an unproblematic consensus
within and between the local state and commu-
nities and therefore see the approach as ‘a good
thing’. In the latter, the coercive nature of the
local state causes conflict in interagency rela-
tions and is therefore ‘a bad thing’. Crawford
and Jones claim this dichotomous assessment
is over-simplistic in that “it fails to give due sig-
nificance to the fact that competing perspectives
are premised upon very different understandings
of the complex structures, relationships, and in-
teractive exchanges within and between state
agencies, communities and the market” (Craw-
ford and Jones, 1995: 19).
In the context of Northern Ireland, Garrett’s
(1999) study evaluated the response of state
agencies through a joint working initiative be-
tween police and social workers to child abuse
and domestic violence. He concluded that the
role of the agencies and their operational prac-
tices could only be understood if the abnormality
of the Northern Ireland state(let) was recognised.
Because the political and moral legitimacy of
the state has been routinely contested, he argued,
“this has also inescapably impinged on, con-
strained, even determined, the nature and extent
of interventions by the police and social work-
ers” (Garrett, 1999: 32).
Studies in allied areas therefore appear to sug-
gest three things. First, that an integrated or
joined-up approach can offer the potential for
an improved response to victims of violence, al-
though there are circumstances which could
exacerbate their plight. Second, the nature of the
pre-existing relationships between the agencies
(in particular the statutory bodies) and the cli-
ent group is an important determinant of its likely
success. Third, and as a direct consequence, ef-
fective interagency approaches to crime may be
both context- and issue-specific. There is some
evidence, for example, that because Northern
Ireland is ‘abnormal’, the involvement of state
bodies curtails their potential effectiveness in
tackling social problems (Garrett, 1999). Hence
research from Great Britain, it might be argued,
is not directly comparable. The specific circum-
stances of Northern Ireland and the peculiar na-
ture of paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and
shootings therefore make the role of statutory
and voluntary organisations worthy of investi-
gation.
The research for this article was undertaken
as part of a wider ESRC-funded project whose
aim was to examine the operation of the infor-
mal criminal justice system in Northern Ireland
and evaluate the response of government and
non-governmental agencies to this phenomenon.
The primary research involved conducting semi-
structured interviews with 40 victims of
paramilitary-style attacks, 44 representatives
from state, quasi-state and community organi-
sations with direct contact/responsibility for
victims, and 12 political party spokespersons;
holding focus group interviews in four commu-
nities where there was evidence of a high level
of paramilitary activity; and the construction of
a database on the level and location of attacks
(using GIS) on a Northern Ireland-wide basis to
show patterns/clusters of activity. Access to
agency respondents tended to be at second-tier
level or those most directly involved in the case
of community organisations. Given the sensi-
tivities of the subject matter, interviewees would
have been reluctant to provide access had the
study been sponsored by the Northern Ireland
Office for example, which has vested interests
in the topic. A key issue for the researchers was
to establish their bona fides within the constitu-
ency and to demonstrate objectivity in one’s
approach to the study. While the funding source
clearly helped with the former, the polarisation
of views in relation to community background
made the latter much more difficult to achieve
in practice (Knox, 2001a). What therefore is the
current response among statutory and voluntary
organisations to this type of criminal activity and
could those subject to such attacks benefit from
a joined-up response? Before addressing this
question it is necessary to describe the nature
and extent of the problem facing the various
agencies in Northern Ireland.
The nature and extent of the
problem
So-called ‘punishment’ attacks, beatings and
shootings have been a feature of paramilitary
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control over both communities in Northern Ire-
land throughout  the ‘troubles’. Paramilitary
groups see themselves as community protectors;
their actions are aimed ostensibly at maintain-
ing ‘law and order’ through tackling petty crime
such as car theft, joyriding, burglary and drug
dealing. According to police statistics between
1973 and the end of 2001 there have been 2,563
paramilitary ‘punishment’ shootings (an average
of 88 per year) of which 45% have been perpe-
trated by loyalists. From 1982 to the end of 2001
there have been 1,822 beatings (an average of
91 per year), 47% of which have been carried
out by loyalists. Police admit that official fig-
ures are thought to underestimate the true extent
of the problem by as much as 30–50% because
victims are reluctant to report incidents for fear
of paramilitary reprisal. There is no information
available on charges brought against perpetra-
tors. Offenders are charged with crimes such as
common assault, grievous bodily harm and ac-
tual bodily harm, hence it is impossible to
ascertain successful police prosecutions.
The figures show there was a significant
increase in beatings and concomitant decrease
in shootings following the ceasefires of August
and October 1994. This reflected moves by
paramilitaries not to implicate their political rep-
resentatives in claims that their ceasefires had
broken down, particularly on the republican side
with their public avowals of non-violent alter-
natives. Since 1996 beatings have decreased but
still remain higher than pre-ceasefire levels, and
shootings are escalating year-on-year. In short,
the situation is getting worse. This is despite the
introduction of non-violent restorative justice
programmes in both loyalist and republican ar-
eas aimed at responding to the needs and harm
experienced by victims, offenders and the com-
munity.
Perpetrators exact community ‘justice’ using
pickaxe handles, hockey and hurley sticks, base-
ball bats, steel rods and hammers. Other forms
of ‘punishment’ include dropping heavy concrete
blocks on limbs and using power tools on bones.
Surgeons in the fracture clinic at the Royal Vic-
toria Hospital in Belfast, for example, report that
“following the cessation of violence there has
been an increase in the level of injuries occurring
in those undergoing paramilitary punishment”
(our emphasis) (Nolan et al, 2000). Their study
of treating victims showed that those who had
been shot with pistols, resulting in open inju-
ries, suffered much less damage to soft tissue
and bones than those who had been beaten. The
reality is that it is ‘better’ to be shot than beaten.
The nature of these incidents is best illustrated
by the account of one victim:
“I was accused by the paramilitaries of do-
ing a burglary, which I didn’t do. They
didn’t believe me. So they said they had a
witness to identify me. They came back
for me and took me to the Markets (an
area in Belfast). They held me from eight
o’clock until half eleven, continually beat-
ing me with sticks, punching me, kicking
me, just laying into me, left, right and cen-
tre, asking questions, ‘Did you do that
burglary?’, ‘No I didn’t do it’. They didn’t
believe me so they just laid into me and
beat me bad. They said to me at the end
of it that they were taking me outside and
giving me two bullets, one in each ankle.
So I cracked up. I was taken outside with
a hood over my head. My arms were tied
behind my back. They brought me down
an alley, told me to spread-eagle on the
ground. I heard them saying to each other
‘There’s something wrong’ – the gun had
jammed. So they told me to get up. They
grabbed hold of me, brought me into a flat,
got me to lean over a table and three or
four of them beat me with sewer rods from
behind. They lifted me because I couldn’t
walk, took me outside again, kicked and
beat me before heading off. As they were
going I shouted out ‘You Provie bastards,
I didn’t do fuck all’. One of them came
back and said ‘Shut your mouth, you
hooding wee bastard’ and gave me anoth-
er good kicking. After that, the ambulance
came and took me away for treatment.”
(Interview with victim of ‘punishment’ at-
tack, September 2000)
Although exponents of paramilitary ‘justice’
claim that following ‘investigation’ a tariff sys-
tem is in place to match the severity of the
‘crime’, there appears to be little consistency in
the way victims are treated. Paramilitary actions
range from warnings, threats, curfew, beatings
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or shootings to exiling and ultimately execution
(Silke, 1998). This crude emulation of the for-
mal criminal justice system ignores due process
and shows contempt for the human rights of
those who stand accused. Hence, there are cas-
es of mistaken identity, attacks on children as
young as 13 years old, and personal grudges over
money, relationships with women, and control
of drug territory, masquerading as paramilitaries
protecting their communities.
Three principal reasons are advanced for the
existence of the informal criminal justice system
(Knox, 2002). First, particularly in republican
areas, there is an absence of an adequate polic-
ing service. The PSNI (the Police Service of
Northern Ireland, previously the RUC) has no
legitimacy among republicans, and their com-
munities would not normally involve the police
in dealing with crimes in their areas. Republi-
cans claim that the PSNI are prepared to tolerate
at best, or encourage at worst, crime in their
communities as a way of undermining the
‘republican struggle’. Police are therefore will-
ing to ‘trade’ dropping charges of joyriding, drug
dealing, burglary and so on in return for low-
level intelligence gathering on known
republicans. In loyalist areas, objections to in-
volving the police are more to do with keeping
the PSNI out of communities where drug deal-
ing, racketeering and illegal drinking dens and
clubs are commonplace. Second, there is a ris-
ing level of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and petty
crime, particularly in working-class areas. This
is evidenced in crime and victimisation statis-
tics, which show that those from an unskilled
social class background are most vulnerable and
feel their quality of life is particularly affected
by fear of crime (Northern Ireland Office,
2000a). A Police Authority (PANI – now re-
placed by the Policing Board) report which
monitored the performance of the RUC during
1998/99 found “many categories of crime are
on the increase while police performance in tack-
ling this has not always been as effective as
anticipated” (PANI, 1999:9). The most recent
recorded crime figures show an increasing trend
during 2000/01 (RUC, 2001). In the absence,
therefore, of a legitimate police force and/or
because people are discouraged from seeking
PSNI involvement, communities turn to paramil-
itaries to secure a prompt, visible and effective
response to crime in their areas. Hence, local
people living in fear of crime endorse paramili-
tary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings. Third,
the formal criminal justice system within these
communities is perceived as slow, ineffectual,
and soft on crime. In a society where violent
conflict has been the norm for over thirty years,
it isn’t surprising that the time taken to process
offenders, the necessary safeguards in the legal
system, and the standard of proof required for
conviction is seen as no match for summary jus-
tice meted out by paramilitaries.
‘Punishing’ mainly young people is therefore
tacitly or explicitly supported by communities
and in some cases endorsed by unlikely sources
such as the aberrant clergyman Father Pat Buck-
ley who said:
I have never come across a case where the
victim of a punishment squad was inno-
cent. When I hear the names of those who
have been beaten up I often recognise
them as well-known criminals. I have no
sympathy whatsoever for criminals and
their families who squeal like pigs when
they, the guilty, get a touch of the treatment
they happily mete out to the innocent.
(Buckley, 1995: 16)
It is against this background that we consider
the possibilities for a joined-up response to the
ongoing violent control exerted by paramilitaries
whose political representatives have signed up
to ‘exclusively democratic and peaceful means’
of resolving issues as part of the Belfast Agree-
ment.
The community context for a
joined-up response
Before considering how agencies, both govern-
mental and non-governmental, have responded
to this issue it is important to outline the cir-
cumstances within which these ‘punishment’
attacks take place and the nature of the relation-
ship between paramilitary groups and the
communities over which they exert social con-
trol. Cavanaugh (1997), in an ethnographic study
undertaken in loyalist and republican commu-
nities in Belfast, posited the community, not as
a passive entity, but integral to the analysis of
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political violence in Northern Ireland. She sug-
gested civil society in Northern Ireland was
characterised by a strong sense of community,
ethnic separatism, and a tradition of loyalism
and republicanism in both its cultural and polit-
ical forms. “With basic security needs left
unfulfilled and fear of identity loss prevalent in
both republican and loyalist communities, strong
intra-communal infrastructures have evolved
which protect and promote community cohe-
sion” (Cavanaugh,  1997: 46). This strong
communal cohesion, she argued, demands so-
cial order and control constructed through
‘alternative legalities to that of the state’.
Paramilitaries claim to be responding to pop-
ular pressure and in turn engage in swift and
violent ‘punishments’ carried out without regard
for the human rights of the victim or due legal
process. The system becomes self-perpetuating
and reinforcing. It satisfies the response of
communities for ‘justice’ and reinforces the
dominant role of paramilitaries who wish to ex-
ert social control in their areas. This culture of
violence also means that communities are afraid
to speak out against such activities. When young
people in these areas become involved in crim-
inal behaviour they are more likely to encounter
paramilitaries than the police. Some see this as
a challenge and part of a subculture of bravado
among their peer group. Rarely, however, can
they match the weaponry or force of organised
paramilitary ‘punishment’ gangs who adminis-
ter the informal criminal justice system under
the guise of community ‘police’.
What is difficult to understand, however, is the
acceptance by some of the victims of their ‘de-
serving’ fate at the hands of paramilitaries, indeed
even their compliance with the informal system.
This has led, for example, to ‘punishment’ at-
tacks and shootings being carried out by mutual
arrangement between paramilitaries and victims,
or ‘punishment’ by appointment. All of this il-
lustrates the complex dynamic relationship which
exists between communities and paramilitary or-
ganisations. As recorded crime continues to rise
in Northern Ireland,2 communities have little op-
tion but to rely on paramilitaries for ‘protection’.
There is little confidence in either the police or
criminal justice system within republican or loy-
alist communities, albeit for different reasons.
The prospect of a radical shift in support for the
organs of the state is unlikely in the short term
under changes resulting from the parallel reviews
– Patten on policing (Independent Commission
on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999) and the
Criminal Justice Review. Nationalists and repub-
licans are critical of what they see as the dilution
of Patten’s recommendations into law. These
discussions are inextricably linked to the wider
political debate. In the meantime, communities
are caught up in this cycle of crime and violence
with only the paramilitaries to turn to, either by
choice or force of circumstance. Those within
communities who wish to see the stranglehold
of paramilitaries loosen have few alternatives. To
raise one’s head above the parapet runs the risk
of crossing the hard men of violence. This has
become increasingly hazardous as paramilitaries
in ceasefire circumstances, particularly in loyal-
ist communities, diversify further into drugs,
racketeering and extortion.
The response of governmental
and non-governmental agencies
Minimisation and indifference
Two key responses were discernible across the
range of statutory and non-statutory organisa-
tions to the problem of ‘punishment’ beatings
and shootings by the paramilitaries. The first of
these, most characteristic of statutory organisa-
tions, has been minimisation of, and indifference
to, the problem, or what Conway describes as
“reactive containment” (Conway, 1994: 99). Par-
amilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings
are but one component of what has become
known in Northern Ireland as ‘an acceptable lev-
el of violence’. This response is informed by a
number of factors. Those subjected to beatings
and shootings tend not to engender sympathy
either from the police or, more often, the com-
munities within which they reside as referred to
above. In the case of the former, the PSNI claim
that those attacked will usually have been in-
volved in ‘anti-social behaviour’ (car theft,
joyriding, burglary, drug-dealing and so on) and
may have a criminal record, and are therefore
reluctant to report the crime lest they are inves-
tigated. There is also fear of reprisal from
paramilitaries should they cooperate with the
police. As one senior police officer pointed out,
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“We are unfortunately in a Catch 22 situation ...
if they refuse to make a witness statement, then
in fact the PSNI is at a loss in many regards,
unless we have the forensic evidence or unless
they’re caught in the act” (interview with PSNI/
RUC Chief Superintendent, December 2000).
Communities on the other hand feel they have
little option but to tacitly or explicitly support
the actions of paramilitaries. They are unwill-
ing and/or reluctant to go to the PSNI, feel
threatened or terrorised by crimes perpetrated
in their areas and respond accordingly. “People
want instant justice. They are not prepared to
wait on the rules of evidence, on long processes
of the court – they feel ‘We are the victims and
we want something done about it now’. The par-
amilitaries respond to this” (community focus
group respondent, November 2000). In sum, the
PSNI feel limited in their response, communi-
ties demand protection from crime in their areas
and those attacked are fearful of paramilitary re-
prisal. The police therefore acquiesce in the
status quo.
This indifference is confirmed, and in some
cases compounded, by the response of other stat-
utory agencies. The Police Authority (PANI), for
example, receives information from the PSNI on
the number of ‘punishment’ beatings and shoot-
ings but cannot disaggregate data on detection
rates from reported ‘violence against the person’
statistics. This is rather surprising given that the
Authority meets with the Chief Constable on a
monthly basis and paramilitary beatings, attacks
and shootings “always feature very prominent-
ly in the monthly report” (interview with Police
Authority member, January 2000). If, as the
PANI suspects, the detection rate is ‘relatively
low’ and this does not include other means of
paramilitary control such as exiling individuals
from an area or imposing curfews, then the scale
of illegal activity is likely to be significantly
higher than official statistics suggest. One way
of minimising the problem from the statutory
authorities’ perspective is to deal only in record-
ed figures and, in so doing, ignore the full extent
of the problem. A PANI representative put this
more diplomatically:
“There may not be a specific reference to
paramilitary assaults, partly because of the
Authority’s determination not to depart
from its stand that these amount to crimi-
nal assaults, violence against the person.
I think, at one level, whilst we do look at
them under separate headings, at another
level we don’t want to give them a special
legitimacy by singling them out. There’s
that kind of ... not double  standards
approach, but there’s that kind of schizo-
phrenic approach to them.” (Interview
with Police Authority member, January
2000)
The PSNI in turn is accused by republicans of
demoralising communities by manipulating
those involved in anti-social behaviour and thus
undermining the ‘republican struggle’. “It has
employed anti-social elements as informers in
return for immunity from prosecution. This has
allowed anti-soc ial activity to escalate”
(McGuinness, 1999: 16).
The Northern Ireland Office’s response is to
see ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings more
within a general framework of crime prevention
and community safety which seeks to address
the causes of anti-social behaviour. They do not
commit resources directly to the problem and
didn’t think they had made any impact upon it
(from an interview with a Northern Ireland Of-
fice official, February 2000). Their interest in
the issue appeared to peak, perhaps predictably,
when it became inextricably linked with the
political agenda of the day.
Disjointed approach
The second key response by agencies could be
described as a disjointed approach to the prob-
lem. There are several manifestations of this. At
the inter-sectoral level, for example, there is no
obvious collaboration between the statutory,
voluntary, community and support sectors. The
Probation Board is an executive non-departmen-
tal public body (a quango) within the Northern
Ireland Office which also grant-aids three vol-
untary organisations in the criminal justice field:
the Northern Ireland Association for the Care
and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO), the
Extern Organisation and Victim Support (NI),3
all of whom have direct or indirect involvement
with those who have been subjected to beatings
and shootings.  The Probation Board sees its con-
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tribution being in the area of funding communi-
ty development groups to work in schemes with
“difficult young people … who are causing dam-
age or sometimes an extreme nuisance … so  that
the community wouldn’t feel obliged to take
unacceptable action against them” (interview
with senior Probation Board official, May 2000).
NIACRO provides a crisis intervention service
for individuals who are under paramilitary threat
through an organisation known as BASE 2. This
can range from checking the authenticity of the
threat to trying to mediate for its removal and,
in the last event if the person threatened is exiled,
assisting them with the necessary arrangements.
Extern provides programmes of intensive sup-
port for young people (Time Out and Youth
Support) through referrals from the social serv-
ices. Although these programmes are not aimed
specifically at those subject to paramilitary
threat, there are cases where this applies. Vic-
tim Support (NI) offers a listening service and
practical advice on forms of help available to
those who have been hurt by crime or their fam-
ily members.
What is clear from the services provided by
this range of organisations is that collaboration
between these agencies, all of which are funded
from the one source, is ad hoc, non-existent or
personality dependent. Aside from Base 2, those
subjected to paramilitary attacks are seen as part
of a general client portfolio within which their
specific needs are neither identified nor ad-
dressed. There is little or no understanding of
the impact of the services they are providing on
paramilitary beatings and shootings. Indeed in
some cases there is an open admission that the
effectiveness of their services is marginal to the
needs of those that have been shot and beaten.
One respondent suggested his organisation had
“very little impact for two reasons ... first, we
have been developing our responses over the past
five years ... and second, we have been working
in a climate whereby there has been a perception
that regardless of how hard anyone argues
against it , physical punishment works”
(interview with senior official – volunta ry
organisation, June 2000). There is also evidence
of disagreement between the provider agencies
about giving financial support to organisations
such as BASE 2 whose work was described by
a government minister as “being seen to imple-
ment a social exclusion policy for paramilitaries”
(cited from interview with NIACRO official,
June 2000).  Some statutories have also been
unwilling to work with voluntary organisations
which refuse to recognise the police.
The second manifestation of a disjointed ap-
proach is at the interagency level. Three of the
most important agencies for those who have been
beaten or shot by paramilitaries are the Social
Security Agency, the Northern Ireland Housing
Executive, and the Compensation Agency.4 None
of these agencies records separate data on ap-
plicants that present with injuries resulting from
paramilitary attacks; all are dealt with under their
existing client classification schemes. The So-
cial Security Agency was, for example, “unaware
of public criticism” that had been levelled at the
amount of benefit to which a father of three who
had lost both his legs in a shotgun paramilitary
shooting was entitled. The same organisation
was the subject of a recommendation from the
Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner’s Re-
port that in dealing with victims, they should
“be sensitive and understanding in their ap-
proach” (Bloomfield, 1998: 50). The Housing
Executive “hadn’t come across” situations where
a member of a family was subjected to paramil-
itary intimidation and felt they had to move
rather than break up the family. Both of these
admissions point to either a denial of the prob-
lem and/or a failure to respond to those who had
been attacked, shot or intimidated. The Com-
pensation Agency, on the other hand, suggested
these cases “need careful handling” because they
are expensive to settle (interviews with officials
in the respective agencies). The agency is re-
quired by legislation to compensate ‘innocent
victims of violent crime’ (our emphasis). In so
doing, it must take into account ‘the character
and way of life’ of applicants as evidenced by
their criminal record. Those who were judged
to have contributed by their own activities to the
violence inflicted upon them could have their
compensation claim rejected or reduced. This
necessarily involves cooperating with the police,
but the agency never sees the applicant. The
agencies presented a picture of a disjointed and
less than sympathetic approach to those subject-
ed to this kind of attack. As one official
suggested, “We don’t assume with every other
applicant that they’re going to have a lengthy
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criminal record but with a ‘punishment’ attack I
think we maybe do have a predisposition to think
‘There’ll be a criminal record here”’ (interview
with Compensation Agency official, December
2000).
The third manifestation of a disjointed ap-
proach is the emergence and operation of victim
support groups. The status of victims in general
assumed greater importance with the early re-
lease of terrorist prisoners under the terms of
the Good Friday Agreement. As a consequence,
victim support voluntary groups, some of whom
offer services to those who had been subjected
to paramilitary ‘punishment’ attacks and shoot-
ings, burgeoned. Not only has this resulted in
overlap, duplication and confusion in terms of
the services which are provided, but because the
legitimacy of victim status has been challenged,
there are organisations claiming to represent ‘in-
nocent victims’ exclusively (Knox, 2001b).
Hence support groups set up to deal with vic-
tims of ‘state violence’, such as families of the
IRA members shot dead in Loughgall by the
SAS in 1987, found themselves in conflict with
‘deserving’ victim groups. In these terms, the
status of those who have been beaten and shot
by paramilitaries is similarly ambiguous, with
communities in some cases endorsing ‘punish-
ment’. The plethora of organisations offering
some kind of victim support such as the WAVE
Trauma Centre, Families Acting for Innocent
Relatives, Victim Support, Institute of Counsel-
ling and Personal Development, Survivors of
Trauma, Shankill Stress Centre, and the Family
Trauma Centre therefore struggle to find a dis-
tinctive role. Their attempt to provide a range of
services simply adds to the disjointed nature of
provision. They compete to survive on short-
term funding in an area where the long-term
needs of the ‘punished’ are not being addressed.
Obstacles to a ‘joined-up’
response
A number of explanations are posited as to why
Northern Ireland cannot easily respond in a
joined-up way to communal violence. The La-
bour government, according to Bevir and Rhodes
(2001: 126), promotes the “idea of networks of
institutions and individuals acting in partnership
held together by relations of trust”. Networks
institutionalise Labour’s ideals of partnership as
a joined-up approach within an enabling state.
This analysis is shared by Shearing (2000) in
his suggestions for tackling the proliferation of
illegal forms of policing associated with para-
militaries. He argued that the police could no
longer claim a monopoly on crime control and a
range of institutions  now take responsibility
within a policing network for the governance of
security. In other words, “policing has been rad-
ically pluralized” and what is required is “a
regulatory process with the capacity to ensure
that the policing network operates within the law
and in partnership with state institutions” (Shear-
ing, 2000: 388). The Patten Commission on
Policing in Northern Ireland (of which Shear-
ing was a member) proposed a strategy to
promote the value of a policing network with a
wide variety of nodes “subject to effective regu-
lation and democratic direction” (Shearing,
2000: 389; see also McGarry and O’Leary, 1999;
Ellison and Smyth, 2000). The proposed strategy
was to comprise two elements – the establish-
ment of a Policing Board to direct and regulate
policing across the Province and the creation of
state funding arrangements that would support
a wide range of legitimate policing nodes. While
Patten held out the prospect of policing as a col-
lective responsibility or a ‘partnership for
community safety’, its implementation into law
(2000 Police [Northern Ireland] Act) failed to
deliver on its central principles. Hence, accord-
ing to Hillyard and Tomlinson (2000), “the
radical and progressive ideas of Patten have been
effectively policed and the people of Northern
Ireland are left with a traditional model of po-
licing in which citizens have little say and even
less influence to determine democratically the
form and practice of policing in their areas”
(Hillyard and Tomlinson, 2000: 415). Policing,
in these circumstances, is unlikely to be seen as
a partnership but rather a restatement of the tri-
partite hierarchy (Secretary of State, Policing
Board and Chief Constable) very much in the
traditional mould.
The idea of the police and the criminal justice
system being the sole preserve of crime preven-
tion and control is also addressed in the emerging
literature on governance (Foucault, 1991; Sten-
son, 1993; Garland, 1996, 1997; O’Malley et al,
1997). Therein responsibility for tackling crime
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involves cooperation and partnership arrange-
ments across government and non-governmental
organisations, communities and the private sec-
tor. As crime becomes “a taken for granted
element of late modernity” according to Garland
(1996: 446), then it should be treated in the same
way as other risks such as ill-health and unem-
ployment and dealt with accordingly through
individuals securing their homes and property,
improved environmental measures (street light-
ing and housing estate design) and greater
insurance protection. Hence, the responsibility
of the state for crime control  is devolved
downwards and a more “prudent citizen” is em-
powered to take ownership and “purchase the
level of commodified security they deem appro-
priate to their specific needs” (O’Malley, 1996:
202). In applying notions of ‘risk’, ‘trust’ and
‘governance’ to the circumstances of Northern
Ireland, O’Mahony et al (2000) argue that these
imply a congruence in the goals of agencies,
communities and individuals in relation to crime
reduction. Such an ‘active partnership’, they sug-
gest, is problematic in Northern Ireland for a
number of reasons. It would have to involve col-
laboration between republicans and loyalists in
working-class communities; the legitimacy of
the state within partnerships could not be taken
for granted; and the state could not take the lead
responsibility in structures where there was a
strong civil society. O’Mahony et al (2000: 127)
conclude that “with these issues in mind, the
challenges facing the new Northern Ireland in
developing active partnerships between govern-
ment institutions, communities and civil society
are formidable”. The problem in Northern
Ireland is that active partnerships must be pred-
icated on trust which is in short supply between
the key stakeholders. The state and its organs
(for example PSNI and the Northern Ireland Of-
fice) are integral to the conflict and its various
manifestations such as communal violence. In
fact there is a deep mistrust, particularly (but
not exclusively) in republican areas of ‘the Brit-
ish establishment’, most recently evidenced by
their unwillingness to endorse the Patten imple-
mentation plan on police reforms and sit on the
newly formed Policing Board. Similarly, com-
munities, particularly in loyalist areas, distrust
paramilitaries even though, by default, they have
sought their assistance in combating communi-
ty crime. The ongoing internecine disputes be-
tween loyalist paramilitaries only adds to the
perception within communities that, in the ab-
sence of a political conflict, these groups are
promoting their own self-interests.
The move from Direct Rule administration in
Northern Ireland to devolution may, somewhat
ironically, make a joined-up response more dif-
ficult. Under Direct Rule the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, a Westminster cabinet min-
ister, had direction and control of all government
departments for which he/she was accountable
to Parliament. Working through the Northern Ire-
land Office, the Secretary of State, assisted by
two ministers of state and two parliamentary
under-secretaries, had overall responsibility for
the government of Northern Ireland. To some
extent this institutionalised joined-up govern-
ment by dint of its political coherence and
command structure. With the devolution of pow-
er in December 1999 to the Northern Ireland
Assembly and its Executive Committee of Min-
isters, local politicians now have full legislative
and executive authority over the functions of the
Northern Ireland departments. The Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland remains responsible
for Northern Ireland Office matters not devolved
to the Assembly such as policing, security poli-
cy, prisons, criminal justice, international
relations and taxation. The pressures of depart-
mentalism where ministers feel compelled to
represent their sectional interests are compound-
ed by a executive coalition elected on the
d’Hondt system with fundamental political dif-
ferences likely to contribute to entrenched
administrative and political fiefdoms. Hardly a
recipe for joined-up government. The Democrat-
ic Unionist Party, for example, refuses to
participate in the Executive and the First Minis-
ter banned Sinn Féin from attending North/South
Ministerial Council meetings.
An interesting comparison here is devolution
in Scotland. Parry (2001) reports that the Scot-
tish Office, prior to devolution, had a strong
central grip of its functional entities and in prin-
ciple provided a joined-up corporate focus able
to resist departmental pressures within the bu-
reaucracy. Post-devolution this had the potential
to unravel as Scottish ministers were appointed
with departmental briefs. To preserve the cor-
porate cohesion and not create ministries that
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would become power bases, three powerful cen-
tral units were established to resist monolithic
departments serving their ministers. This has not
happened in Northern Ireland. Moreover, Parry
(2001: 40) argues that “the Scottish Executive
has not entrenched a separation between its pol-
icy sphere and the areas reserved to the United
Kingdom Government. Its main policy docu-
ment Social justice mixed devolved and reserve
policy instruments in pursuit of an anti-poverty
strategy”. He concludes that the Scottish
Executive has chosen to emphasise the interde-
pendence of devolved and reserved functions.
In tackling communal violence in Northern
Ireland this interdependence and capacity for a
corporate response is less likely to exist. Anti-
Agreement Unionists have used the issue of
‘punishment’ beatings and shootings as an op-
portunity to discredit its outworking. In a debate
in the Northern Ireland Assembly, Ian Paisley
(Democratic Unionist Party leader) argued “a
misguided political agenda has brought about
increased communal violence. I would, in fact,
go further and describe the political agenda as
one which is criminal-supporting. These beat-
ings and shootings expose the failures of the
Belfast Agreement” (Paisley, 2001: 357). Each
of the ten Northern Ireland statutory commit-
tees has a scrutiny,  policy deve lopment,
consultation role in relation to its department and
in the initiation of legislation. This is not con-
ducive to tackling a cross-departmental policy
issue such as communal violence, likely to in-
volve not only devolved functional areas such
as housing, social security and voluntary activ-
ity, but also excepted and reserved matters
(policing, probation services, compensation,
criminal justice). In short, the absence of trust,
a necessary prerequisite for a network of insti-
tutions and individuals acting in a joined-up way,
accentuated by systemic political and adminis-
trative obstacles resulting from devolution,
produces a fragmented approach to tackling
communal violence.
Conclusions
Having considered the response of governmen-
tal and non-governmental agencies, could those
who have been subjected to paramilitary ‘pun-
ishment’ benefit from an integrated approach?
The empirical work suggests that agencies, in
particular statutory bodies, currently either min-
imise the problem or remain indifferent to it. The
net result is a disjointed response at both inter-
sectoral and interagency levels complicated
further by the plethora of new and established
victim support groups. This finding is not dis-
similar to work on domestic violence in Northern
Ireland which concluded that “state institutions
(the police and other professional help-provid-
ers) through their responses or attitudes, either
minimise or rationalise the abuse” (McWilliams,
1997: 89). Several agencies that include social
services, police, the probation service, medical
services and education have recently collabo-
rated in risk assessment and management of sex
offenders in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland
Office, 2000b). Research in allied areas such as
domestic and racial violence in Great Britain
suggests a joined-up approach could offer the
potential for an improved response to those that
have been beaten or shot by paramilitaries. How-
ever, the nature of pre-existing relationships
between agencies and the client group was found
to be an important determinant of success.
Therein lies the problem. There is deep suspi-
cion and mistrust of the statutory authorities, in
particular the PSNI, whom some victims per-
ceive as trying to recruit them. They also sense
that government agencies see them as somehow
deserving of the ‘punishment’ meted out. In the
case of other bodies such as the Social Security
Agency and Compensation Agency, victims de-
tect an unwillingness or reluctance to expend
public resources because of their ‘character and
way of life’. This suspicion of the statutories is
compounded by the climate of fear within which
those who have been ‘punished’ live. Cooperat-
ing with government agencies could be seen as
one step away from collusion – paramilitary re-
prisal could be swift, brutal and perhaps fatal.
Yet the ‘service’ provided to victims of paramil-
itary attacks is fragmented, patchy and in many
cases accusing. They have become expendable
pawns in pursuit of political gains at the macro
level. It is not politically expedient to argue that
the brutality they experience constitutes a clear
breach of the Mitchell principles of ‘democracy
and non-violence’ which inform the Belfast
Agreement. Presenting as a heterogeneous group
of largely young men from socially deprived ar-
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eas means that statutory bodies can treat them
with indifference and in some cases contempt.
The need for a joined-up response is clearly nec-
essary to tackle this problem; the resolve to do
so is thus far lacking.
One useful policy learning exercise from Great
Britain is the role which the Treasury has played
in coordination through its control of public
spending. Kavanagh and Richards (2001:12) re-
ported that a systematic review of policies which
cut across departments was undertaken in the
1997–98 Spending Review and money directed
accordingly. They point out that the Treasury
now allocates money for clients, for example
Sure Start Programme for children under five,
for a problem area, as in criminal justice, or for
a general area, as in New Deal for the Commu-
nities. The  Northern Ireland Executive’s
Programme for government (2001: section 1.14)
also intends “to support programmes or projects
which are of major importance to the Executive.
This could include projects that will assist the
development of activity across departments as
well as supporting key projects that an individual
department may not be able to support from its
own resources”. As a result, it has allocated Ex-
ecutive Programme Funds to five policy areas
(social inclusion/community regeneration, serv-
ice modernisation, new directions, infrastructure/
capital renewal and children). They are all “con-
sistent with the Executive’s priorities as set out
in the Programme for Government” and hence
have a decidedly devolved remit. What is miss-
ing is the Scottish experience of imaginative
thinking in tackling issues which straddle de-
volved and excepted/reserved powers such as
communal violence in Northern Ireland. Until
relations of trust develop which promote the idea
of a network of institutions and individuals act-
ing in partnership to tackle communal violence,
and the boundaries of functional responsibili-
ties become less significant,  a joined-up
response to this problem seems unlikely. As a
consequence communal violence will continue
unabated.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the support
of ESRC funding (grant: L133251003) in carry-
ing out this work and the research assistance of
Rachel Monaghan and Dermot Feenan with
fieldwork. The author also received very help-
ful comments from Dave Cowan (Bristol) and
external referees.
Notes
1 The three aims in modernising government are
to:
 ensure that policy making is more joined-up
and strategic;
 make sure that public service users, not pro-
viders, are the focus, by matching services
more closely to people’s lives;
 deliver public services that are high quality
and efficient.
2 A Home Office Report on international crime
statistics showed Northern Ireland’s percentage
increase in recorded crime (28%) was second
only to South Africa where it rose by 37% in
1998. Northern Ireland also experienced the larg-
est rise of the 29 countries examined in the report
in the area of recorded violent crime, with an
increase of 21%, while England and Wales, and
Ireland recorded decreases of 6% and 17% re-
spectively (Barclay and Tavares, 2000).
3 In 1998-99 NIACRO, Extern and Victim Sup-
port (NI) received £303,000, £447,000 and
£667,000 respectively from the Criminal Justice
Directorate of the Northern Ireland Office (De-
partment of Finance & Personnel and HM
Treasury, 1999).
4 The Social Security Agency, the Compensa-
tion Agency and the Northern Ireland Housing
Executive are located within the Department of
Health and Social Services and Public Safety
(formerly, the Department of Health and Social
Services), the Northern Ireland Office, and the
Department of Social Development (formerly the
Department of the Environment) respectively.
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